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This paper sheds light on the views of Mulla Sadra about virtue and 
action. The main question is how he explains the relationship, if any, 
between virtue and action. Mulla Sadra defines moral virtue as a settled 
inner disposition by which one acts morally, without need for any 
reflection or deliberation. This study seeks to explain how, according 
to Mulla Sadra, a virtue motivates the agent and leads him to do the 
right action easily. Is virtue the reason for or cause of action? Is there a 
semantic link between action and virtue? Can we regard an action as 
right if it is not motivated by a virtue? Another question is about the 
role of action in the development of moral character. Is virtue acquired 
through the practice of corresponding actions? If we divide virtues into 
moral and intellectual, we should ask about the relationship between an 
epistemic action and intellectual virtues as well. In addition, since 
Mulla Sadra is a Muslim religious thinker, explaining the role of faith 
and religious rituals in forming moral character and also the 
relationship between faith and moral action is important. This paper 
will show that Mulla Sadra accepts the semantic, metaphysical, and 
psychological relationships between virtue and action. 
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Introduction 
The relationship between virtue and action can be understood in four 
ways: semantic, epistemological, metaphysical, and psychological. The 
semantic connection between moral (or intellectual) virtue and right 
action holds if one defines virtue in terms of right action or defines right 
action in terms of virtue. So, what is the right action? Is it an action that 
does not necessarily come from virtue, or is it one that is performed by 
the virtuous person regardless of the circumstances? 
If we claim that virtue is defined according to right action, not only 
should action be used as part of the definition of virtue but also virtue 
becomes a type of action. And if we claim that right action is defined 
according to virtue, then action is not right or, at least, not valuable 
without virtue. As a result, right action becomes an action performed 
out of virtue.  
There are versions of virtue ethics that insist on a semantic link 
between virtue and moral action. Virtue ethicists, who base the 
definition of moral action on the concept of  virtuous person, virtuous 
motive, or virtue itself, often believe in this kind of link. For example, 
Hursthouse and Slote have indeed accepted this kind of link. 
Hursthouse defines right action as “what a virtuous agent would, 
characteristically, do in the circumstances” (Hursthouse 1999). Michael 
Slote explains right action according to virtuous motivation (Slote 
2001) and believes that an action is right if (and because) it exhibits or 
expresses a virtuous motive, or at least does not exhibit or express a 
vicious motive (Van Zyle 2009). Zagzebski, as well, subscribes to this 
perspective when she states that “the moral exemplar is the basis of 
ethics” (Zagzebski 2010; 2012) and when she tries to define the other 
moral concepts including moral action. Since a moral exemplar is a 
virtuous person,1 it is true that being virtuous is the basis of ethics. “All 
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Mulla Sadra on Virtue and Action / 57 
 
 
other basic moral concepts,” she says, “are defined by reference to 
exemplars—a virtue, a desirable life, a right act, and a good outcome” 
(Zagzebski 2012, 157). So, virtue, in her view, “is a trait we admire in 
an admirable person … that makes the person paradigmatically good in 
a certain respect” (2010, 54; 2012, 159), and the right act “is what the 
admirable person would take to be most favored by the balance of 
reasons in circumstances” (2012, 159).  
Virtue epistemologists accept this kind of connection between 
rational inquiries and intellectual virtues and define knowledge as a true 
belief that arises out of intellectual virtue (e.g., Zagzebski 1996). The 
epistemological relationship between virtue and right action is related 
to the role moral and intellectual virtues play in the recognition of what 
one should do. According to virtue ethics, a practically wise agent has 
such power.  
Sometimes, we ask about the role of virtue in performing moral 
actions, while other times we ask about the role of action in forming 
virtue. Here, we discuss the former connection as psychological and the 
latter as metaphysical. The metaphysical connection between virtue and 
action asks whether moral action has a role in forming virtues, and 
generally in the realization of personal identity, or not. Regarding the 
psychological relationship, we ask whether virtues are able to motivate 
the agent to do a right action or not? If so, are moral virtues sufficient 
for motivating the agent, or are they necessary? 
Philosophers who seek out reasons for action usually ask about the 
role of belief in motivating the agent, and whether it is a sufficient or 
necessary reason. While moral externalists say that “belief is only the 
necessary condition” and that to desire is sufficient (e.g., Aristotle, 
Brink, Shafer-Landau), moral internalists believe that “belief only is the 
sufficient condition for acting” (e.g., Socrates, Kant, Smith, and 
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Korsgaard). Here, we can raise a question about the role of virtue in 
performing the right act. However, answering this question somewhat 
depends on the nature of virtue. 
This paper studies the viewpoint of Mulla Sadra in regard to the 
types of relationship between virtue and action. Mulla Sadra, the Iranian 
Muslim philosopher, is the founder of Transcendent Philosophy. His 
viewpoint in the fields of Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion, 
Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, and Ethics are extremely valuable. 
Arguably, however, his ideas on mind are more important. We can see 
the consequences of his views on the mind in the philosophy of religion, 
ethics, and epistemology.  
According to Mulla Sadra, although philosophers believe that all 
human beings have the same nature and define the human being as a 
rational animal, everybody has an individual identity, which, through 
actualizing their practical and theoretical potentials, builds them 
gradually and makes them distinct from others (Mulla Sadra 1382 Sh, 
128; 1981, 8:343, 9:85). Dispositions of the soul, knowledge, deeds, 
and intentions are the main factors that contribute to forming personal 
identity (Mulla Sadra 1981, vol. 9). Since the constitutive elements are 
different from one person to another, everyone will have their own 
special identity. Mulla Sadra calls this identity the second nature, in 
contrast to the first nature, which refers to tendencies with which we are 
born (Mulla Sadra 1382 Sh). According to his teleological approach, 
the mentioned elements help one to achieve felicity. Mulla Sadra 
explains these ideas on the basis of his philosophical principles like the 
metaphysical primacy of existence (asalat- al-wujud), the substantial 
motion (al-harka al-jawhariyya), as well as the unity of the intellect, 
intelligent, and intelligible (ittihad al-‘aql wa-l-‘aqil wa-l-ma ‘qul). 
Considering the relationship between virtue and action in Mulla 
Sadra’s viewpoint, this paper focuses on three types of this relationship 
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and omits the epistemological one. At the end, it refers to the role of 
faith. It will conclude that Mulla Sadra accepts all the relationships, 
while maintaining that the conception of the right action can only 
depend on the conception of virtue, not vice versa. 
1. The Semantic Relation  
Mulla Sadra, like other Muslim philosophers, defines moral virtue as a 
settled disposition of the soul that helps its possessor do the proper 
action without deliberation and with ease (Mulla Sadra 1981; Naraqi 
1373 AH; Kashani 1960; Miskawayh n.d.). This definition shows that 
virtue is neither a feeling or activity nor a faculty. Instead, a settled, 
inner state is what enables a person to think correctly, to feel properly, 
and to perform moral conduct easily (Mulla Sadra 1981, 4). Moral vice, 
as well, can be defined in this way, with the difference being that a 
virtuous person easily performs good acts and a vicious person easily 
does bad acts without deliberation. The difference between virtue and 
vice is the same as Aristotelians say; that is, virtue is the means and vice 
is either excess or deficiency. Mulla Sadra sometimes, using Qur’anic 
terminology, refers to virtue and vice as angel and satan (Mulla Sadra 
1360 Sh, 351-54). Angel and satan, here, may refer to a good and bad 
character that lead the agent to perform right or wrong actions. 
By this definition, neither Mulla Sadra nor other philosophers accept 
a semantic link between virtue and action and they do not consider the 
concept of virtue to be dependent on that of moral action. However, 
they assert that virtue is one of the defining elements of the moral act. 
Accordingly, moral action is what a virtuous person would do in any 
situation because of his dispositions. For example, a miserly person 
who gives charity—while his action is not morally wrong and he is not 
deserving of punishment—is deficient in ethical value and is not worthy 
of being praised. The most important factor for being ethical is having 
inner purity and a pure heart. This is what makes one’s actions 
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praiseworthy. Given this premise, what makes an action moral? Clearly, 
it is not enough for it to solely be intentional and conscious; rather, it 
depends on the agent’s good character or his pure inner-self. 
In Mulla Sadra’s view, good intention is another criteria for an 
action to be considered good. Therefore, a moral act is defined in terms 
of the motives and dispositions of the agent. As a result, every action 
should be evaluated on the grounds of the goodness of the agent’s 
motives and his virtues.  
According to Mulla Sadra (like other philosophers), intention, 
consciousness, and voluntariness are necessary conditions for right 
action. This is why a person is blameworthy or praiseworthy for his 
action. In other words, the agent is morally responsible for the action 
that has been performed freely, consciously, and intentionally. In 
addition, the desirability of an act—that is, its being right in itself—is 
also necessary. This kind of action is one which the good person is 
permitted to intend and perform. Accordingly, good motives do not 
belong to bad actions. As a result, the goodness of both the agent and 
the act are necessary for an action to be good.  
Up to now, we have discussed the relationship between moral action 
and moral virtue, but such a relationship can also be discussed in regard 
to epistemic action and intellectual virtue. According to Mulla Sadra, 
an action is right epistemically if it arises out of intellectual virtues. In 
this way, knowledge would be obtained (Khazaei 2013). 
2. The Metaphysical Relationship 
The metaphysical relationship explains the role of action or other 
factors in forming good character. Discussion about this is possible if 
we believe that virtues are not natural but acquired. As Aristotle 
mentions, “virtues arise in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature; 
but by our nature we can receive them and perfect them by habituation” 
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1103a). 
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From the viewpoint of Mulla Sadra, human beings naturally have 
the potential of being virtuous. These virtues are acquired through 
struggle and learning—moral virtues are obtained through struggle and 
epistemic virtues through learning. Consequently, Mulla Sadra refers to 
virtue as a habit of the soul which “necessarily [affects] the easy 
procession of an action therefrom, without need of any reflection or 
deliberation. (Mulla Sadra 1981, 4:114). It is worth noting that Mulla 
Sadra divides people into two groups. The first group consists of the 
few who inherently have (or do not have) moral and intellectual virtues, 
and the second group consists of the others who have the potential for 
moral and intellectual virtues. The latter group is able to acquire them 
by struggle and learning. However, the former group, which could 
include a prophet or an innately foolish man, has (or does not have) 
intellectual virtues naturally, and thus does not need or is not able to 
acquire them by learning (Mulla Sadra 1981, 9:87).  
Many philosophers accept the idea of acquiring virtues, especially 
moral virtues. What distinguishes Mulla Sadra from others is his 
belief that human beings do not have a constant identity; rather, they 
gradually build it (Mulla Sadra 1382 Sh, 128; 1981, 8:343; Tusi 1373 
Sh, 7:181). Through this gradual process, dispositions, which are 
among the constitutive factors of human identity, are acquired. 
Therefore, he is responsible not only for his actions and activities but 
also for his character. Indeed, everyone chooses his personal identity 
by way of acting and thinking. As such, the agent is responsible for 
the factors which contribute to the development of his identity 
(Khazaei 2013, 34). 
According to Mulla Sadra, actions, intentions, dispositions and 
knowledge are the constitutive factors in the formation of human 
identity. Among these factors, knowledge is the main factor through 
which human identity will be determined (Mulla Sadra 1981, vol. 9). 
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However, knowledge is an after-product of action. In other words, 
action is the first step that shapes a person into a good or bad person. 
Action builds dispositions, and dispositions prepare the conditions for 
acquiring true knowledge. First, actions produce inner states, and then 
inner states gradually change into settled dispositions. In his work, 
Mulla Sadra maintains that we can acquire good and bad characters, 
which potentially exist in us, through exercising the related good or bad 
actions (Mulla Sadra 1360 Sh, 347). In fact, good actions make the heart 
pure and light, while bad actions make it dark (Mulla Sadra 1360 Sh, 
347). Mulla Sadra calls these dispositions the inner face (esoteric) of 
man or his truth (Mulla Sadra 1366 Sh, 1:297). This truth will appear in 
the afterlife. Thus, moral virtues are acquired by performing the actions 
of a virtuous person. The performance value is used to evaluate the 
agent: the higher the value, the better the agent. 
Just as performing moral acts leads to moral virtues, carrying out 
epistemic actions leads to wisdom. Thus, Mulla Sadra believes that 
exercising, in addition to learning, is necessary for having intellectual 
virtues. Carefulness, fairness, patience, and authenticity are some of the 
acquired intellectual virtues required for acquiring knowledge (Mulla 
Sadra 1981, 9:91).  
Here, I would like to refer to the following supplemental notes:  
1. Considering the effect of actions on the realization of virtues, 
every action is valuable insofar as it brings about a purification 
of the heart and so long as this effect remains. Because of this, 
the amount of reward and punishment of actions varies. 
Therefore, according to Mulla Sadra, actions are not worthy in 
themselves; rather, they are valuable in so far as they result in 
virtues and a pure and illuminated heart (Mulla Sadra 1366 Sh, 
2:63; 1376 Sh). Mulla Sadra goes on to repeatedly mention that 
the right action is not itself the true goodness, but it is important 
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for the heart’s purity (Mulla Sadra 1366 Sh, 1:319, 320; 1366 Sh, 
2:191-92; 1977, 74). 
2. In spite of Mulla Sadra’s emphasis on the importance of the purity 
of heart, he does not consider this purity as the end. Because he 
believes that humanity depends on theoretical knowledge, and 
knowledge is the most important constitutive element of human 
identity, as well as the cause of true happiness or felicity; the 
worth of everything in comparison to knowledge is secondary. In 
this way, purity of heart is important, because it gives the person 
the ability to acquire true knowledge. The more truth one knows, 
the more pious one becomes, as a result of which, he becomes 
more felicitous. Accordingly, good action is a means and true 
knowledge is the final perfection (Mulla Sadra 1366 Sh, 1:319, 
320). The objects of true knowledge are religious entities, such 
as God, prophets, angels, and resurrection. The stronger the 
existence of the object of knowledge, the more valuable the 
acquired knowledge and the greater the felicity of the knower. 
3. Moral and intellectual actions are not the only factors, but rituals 
too have an important role in the purification of the heart and the 
realization of virtues and eradication of vices. In contrast, sins 
and evil actions result in vices and darkening of the heart. As 
moral virtues prepare the mind for acquiring knowledge, moral 
vices result in vices of the mind, like fallacy and fiction. And, in 
the end, one becomes ignorant of the truth (Mulla Sadra 1366 Sh, 
1:386). Although rituals have an important role in moral and 
intellectual development, they are not the end and their value 
depends on their effect on the purification of the heart. For this 
reason, rituals and moral actions are the first step of perfecting 
practical reason. After that, the person, by refraining from vices, 
struggles to purify his heart. At the third step, he gains virtues, 
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but as long as his heart is not purified, it will not be illuminated. 
Only upon purification is his heart able to gain knowledge. Mulla 
Sadra mentions (e.g.. 1981, 9:139; 1360 Sh, 854-56; 1376 Sh, 74) 
that the purpose of rituals and moral actions is the purification of 
the soul and the perfection of practical reason. He further says 
that this purity is not the final purpose; rather, the light of faith is 
the final purpose that will be brought about after achieving purity 
of the heart. This light of faith and the light of knowledge are the 
same in Sadra’s view.  
4. Intention is another factor that plays an important role in forming 
human identity. Action, alongside good intention, gradually 
changes the nature of the human being and makes him a good or 
bad person. Good intentions motivate the agent to perform good 
actions, and good actions make good character. Indeed, intention 
and character have a mutual, internal relationship. Thus, from 
one side, intention defines the level of one’s moral identity, 
while, from the other side, moral character leads to good or bad 
intention.  
Mulla Sadra considers good and bad intentions as the spirit of 
action. In this way, they not only play a role in the rightness of 
actions but also in forming moral and intellectual virtues; that is, 
virtues would be built by good action and good intention. The 
better the intentions, the worthier the actions. Then, peace of 
mind and heart will be achieved. Good motives, here, enable 
good actions to result in a purified heart. Mulla Sadra discusses 
the effect of bad motives on the soul. In his opinion, darkness, 
one that is the result of self-love and deception of others, does 
not allow one to be purified from vices. Bad motives result in a 
veil over the heart which prohibit one from achieving virtues or 
“brightness”  (Mulla Sadra 1367 Sh, 172). 
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The relationship between intention and moral action can be 
understood in two ways: (1) good intention is necessary for an 
action being morally right, and (2) Good intention is not 
necessary for an action to be morally right, but it does make an 
action morally worthwhile and valuable. The first relationship 
may occur if the relationship between intention and action is a 
semantic or metaphysical one. If this is the case, then it is 
possible to (a) consider the intention as a constitutive element of 
the concept of right action, and (b) to believe that the existence 
of moral action depends on good intention. In both cases, if an 
action has been done without a good intention or moral spirit, not 
only is it not valuable but it is not right either. In such a case, the 
agent may deserve punishment. Accordingly, the existence of 
moral action is based on good intention; that is to say, there is no 
moral action without good intention.  
If we say that this relationship (intention and right action) is not 
necessary, we consider good intention as a sufficient condition 
for an action to be valuable, not as a necessary part of its 
definition. In this case, even though an action without good 
intention is not morally valuable, it is nevertheless right.  
When Mulla Sadra argues that the worth of an action depends on 
the level of the heart’s purity, he accepts the latter relationship, 
in which good intention makes an action morally valuable. He 
believes that gaining proximity to God is the best motive. This 
does not mean that an action lacking in this kind of motivation is 
wrong or not valuable, such as performing an act motivated by 
empathy. He even acknowledges that performing actions with the 
pure intention of getting closer to God is very difficult and only 
a few people can achieve such intentions.  
66 / Religious Inquiries 
  
5. Faith is the last factor by which a person strengthens the effect of 
good action on the purification of the heart. Even the lowest level 
of faith can result in an amount of illumination of the heart. 
While gaining proximity to God is the main condition for 
characterizing an action as good, it is also the element that makes 
an action valuable. In general, faith has an important role in 
forming identity. Therefore, in Islamic ethics, although achieving 
virtues is not possible without practice, faith in God plays an 
important role in shaping moral character. In fact, faith in God 
promotes one’s eagerness to perform good deeds which result in 
good character. 
6. Although building virtues requires practice, Mulla Sadra believes 
that all virtues, be they moral, intellectual or religious, are due to 
God’s grace. According to Mulla Sadra’s interpretation, the word 
“wisdom,” as it appears in Surah al-Baqarah1 and also in Surah 
al-Jumu‘a, 2  consists of knowledge as well as moral and 
intellectual virtues (Mulla Sadra 1367 Sh). He believes that God 
graces us with all of them, but gaining such divine grace requires 
struggle. Thus, while God does not force us to do good acts, He 
does love that we act morally and He does help us in this regard. 
3. Psychological Relationship 
The main question here is whether virtues lead to action? In other 
words, do they have a motivational role in the performance of an action? 
Do they cause action? 
Most contemporary philosophers have drawn distinctions between 
normative, motivating, and explanatory reasons. Normative reasons 
                                                     
1. “He grants wisdom to whom He pleases” (Qur’an 2:269). 
2. “It is He who sent to the unlettered [people] an apostle from among 
themselves, to recite to them His signs, to purify them, and to teach them the 
Book and wisdom, and earlier they had indeed been in manifest error.” 
(Qur’an 62:2).  
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justify or favor an action, while motivating reasons are the reasons that 
the agent takes on in order to favor or justify her action and to guide her 
in acting (Alvarez 2016). Different still are explanatory reasons, which 
are the reasons that explain an action. Here, I focus on motivating and 
explanatory reasons as psychological. 
Some Western philosophers, like Zagzebski, believe that virtues, 
moral or intellectual, essentially have a motivational element (1961). 
Muslim philosophers, including Mulla Sadra, when defining virtue as a 
disposition that leads the agent to do right action easily, in fact, have 
argued for this kind of relationship. Although virtue is not a feeling, the 
emotional element of moral virtue is what motivates the agent. If belief 
and desire are two reasons for doing an action, moral virtues could be 
the source of the said belief and desire. Because of this relationship, 
Mulla Sadra says that dispositions are incentives of the soul for doing 
good and bad acts. In Mulla Sadra’s work, will, anger, and lust have 
been called motivational faculties. Nevertheless, he does not accept a 
causal relation between virtue and action (Mulla Sadra 1366 Sh, 1:546). 
Despite his belief that our actions indicate our inner states—that is, our 
dispositions and motives—Mulla Sadra denies that virtues are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for action. He argues that they are 
necessary but not sufficient. Human will is what leads Mulla Sadra to 
adopt this idea. Free will lets a person do or not do an action. 
Knowledge, desire, and intention are three stages through which the 
person performing an action moves. Every stage produces the next stage 
and motivates the agent to do the action (Mulla Sadra 1360 Sh, 351-
54). Significantly, Mulla Sadra believes that no stage requires the next 
stage necessarily, and that next stages do not necessarily follow 
previous ones. Finally, the person would perform what he has chosen 
by his own will. In Mulla Sadra’s view, even after making a decision, 
the agent may defeat his intention and not do what he should do. 
68 / Religious Inquiries 
  
According to Mulla Sadra, only those who have true knowledge can 
necessarily do the right action (Mulla Sadra 1360 Sh, 309-10). He 
explains that only those who have strong will are able to perform an 
action as soon as they imagine or conceive of it. It is here that the 
necessity of the connection between belief and action appears. It seems 
what makes a person do the right action necessarily is either the strength 
and weakness of will (or soul) or the possession of moral and intellectual 
virtues (Mulla Sadra 1981, 9:87). Indeed, the harmony between the 
reason and emotion of a truly virtuous agent is the cause that necessitates 
action. This causal relationship also applies to persons who have weak 
will and lack moral and intellectual virtues; moral and intellectual vices 
guide vicious people to do bad actions quickly and with ease.  
In general, Mulla Sadra cites several causes that make the agent fail 
to do what he should do: 
1. Long-term desires not only prevent a person from thinking of God 
but also create obstacles that hinder good action. 
2. Irrational pleasures, which darken the heart, prevent the agent 
from deliberating, and stop him from doing the right action 
(Mulla Sadra 1366 Sh, 1:337-38). 
3. Ignorance, sins, and vices of the mind are among the causes of 
bad dispositions, which in turn result in immoral actions. Mulla 
Sadra sometimes refers to ignorance as the root of unhappiness, 
particularly the kind of ignorance that has been ingrained. Mulla 
Sadra believes that ignorance and infelicity are from Satan, but 
felicity and knowledge (particularly knowledge that comes with 
proof) are from an angel (Mulla Sadra 1366 Sh, 1:386). He 
argues that ignorance and weakness of will are among the causes 
of fear and immoral behavior (Mulla Sadra 1991, 9:92). 
4. Laziness (or laches), as a psychological factor rather than an 
immoral one, is one of the obstacles that hinder good actions. 
Mulla Sadra on Virtue and Action / 69 
 
 
Maybe this factor, more than others, is proper for justifying the 
virtuous person’s wrong actions, because a virtuous person does 
not perform wrong easily. This relates closely to Aristotle’s 
argument. If a person knows which action is the right action and 
does not have any desire for doing the wrong one and is not 
forced to perform it, then, if he performed a bad action, it would 
be for psychological factors, such as laziness, depression, 
obsession, and desires, as Mele and Davidson have referred to 
(Mele 2009; Davidson 1980, 21-42). 
5. Self-deception is another cause of action, one that the agent 
imagines to be good but in reality is bad. This kind of deception 
sometimes occurs in regard to our intentions, such that good 
intentions seem bad and bad intentions seem good (Mulla Sadra 
1360 Sh, 358-59). Self-deception produces ignorance, which in 
turn results in bad action. Only someone who has gained practical 
and theoretical perfection can understand this kind of deception. 
All of the aforementioned factors would produce a kind of 
irrationality, one that leads a person to do wrong action, because he 
practically and epistemically is not able to do right action. 
4. Faith and Its Connection to Action 
Since Mulla Sadra is a Muslim philosopher, we ask about how the role 
of faith in God may affect this connection: Are they connected to each 
other semantically? Is faith the necessary condition for the rightness or 
value of action? Can it motivate the agent to act? Does faith necessarily 
result in action?  
Mulla Sadra defines faith in God as knowledge; it is not itself a 
kind of action. Nevertheless, he accepts two kinds of relationships 
between action and faith: On the one hand, he says that faith is the 
product of good action. Good action, whether moral, epistemic, or 
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ritual, purifies one’s heart, which in turn prepares the person to receive 
faith from God. Because of this purification process, he believes that 
when an action is done with good intentions, it will produce faith. 
Nevertheless, faith is a gift given from God to some of his servants 
(Mulla Sadra 1366 Sh, 1:310). On the other hand, he argues for the 
psychological relationship between virtue and action, while still 
stressing the motivational role of faith. Faith motivates the person to 
do the action. Strong faith will increase the possibility of performing 
good action. In Sadra’s viewpoint, only the faith of a true believer 
necessitates action. That is, the persons with true knowledge have 
such a capability. For other people, the commitment to do the right 
action depends on their faith; with stronger faith, there is a greater 
possibility of moral commitment. 
Mulla Sadra believes that faith has different degrees. The lowest 
degree is to believe in God and His prophets. After that, at the next 
degree up, a person will get a heart-felt belief, but his heart is not yet 
exposed to the light of knowledge. When he reaches the third degree, 
he will have achieved the insight and vision for religious truths. At the 
last stage, there is nothing that can be present to him except God, who 
is the beginning and the end of everything (Mulla Sadra 1363 Sh, 255, 
257). Given the degrees of faith, it can be guessed that when faith leads 
to action, what kind of action is appropriate for each stage, and to what 
extent the relationship of faith and action can be necessary. 
Conclusion 
In this article, we discussed the semantic, metaphysical, and 
psychological relationship between action and virtue in Mulla Sadra’s 
thought. Explaining these relationships, from one side, depends on the 
definition of virtue and right action, and, from the other side, depends 
on the factors that contribute to the realization of either action or virtue. 
In the semantic relationship, we sought to answer whether or not virtue 
and action are defined in terms of each other. In the metaphysical 
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relationship, we determined how much moral and epistemic action 
existentially depends on moral and epistemic virtue.  
As we mentioned above, Mulla Sadra accepts the semantic 
relationship in a unilateral manner; that is, he defines right action on the 
basis of virtue but not vice versa. He, like Aristotelians and other 
Muslim philosophers, defines virtue as a disposition of the soul that 
makes the possessor of it act easily and without deliberation. Therefore, 
conceptually, right action is defined according to virtue, whether we 
define it, as Hursthouse does, as “what a virtuous agent would, 
characteristically do in the circumstances” (Hursthouse 1999) or as 
Zagzebski says, as something based on moral exemplar. Mulla Sadra 
believes that right action is what is performed by a good person with 
good motives. In addition to free will and consciousness, a moral agent 
should have moral virtues, and an epistemic agent should have 
epistemic virtues in order to perform moral and epistemic action 
properly. Indeed, virtuous action makes the agent praiseworthy. 
Saying that virtues are not natural implies that they are acquired. 
Mulla Sadra accepts the metaphysical relationship between virtue and 
action and believes that not only moral acts, but also rituals, are 
involved in the creation of virtue. Of course, divine grace, as well, plays 
an important role in creating virtue.  
Relying on a psychological connection, we tried to answer whether 
virtues motivate the agent to act. If the belief and desire are the reasons 
for an action, can virtue be considered one of the reasons too? Is virtue 
a necessary and sufficient condition for doing the right action, or it is 
only a motivational reason? Mulla Sadra accepts the psychological 
relationship between virtue and action, where virtue is the reason for 
right action, as belief and desire are the reasons for action. However, 
belief and desire are different from virtue in that belief and desire are 
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stages of performing action, while virtue is not. Instead, virtue is a 
condition for doing the right or admirable action. In fact, virtue enables 
the agent to recognize the right action and to control his feelings and 
behaviors. Because of this, we consider virtue to be the basis of moral 
judgment, good feelings, and proper actions. Virtues are the reasons for 
action, not the causes. Consequently, virtue is not a sufficient condition 
for doing the act, but it is necessary to act properly. Virtue is a sufficient 
condition for only a few people, such as prophets.  
According to Mulla Sadra, since moral action builds one's self-
esteem for moral virtue, it makes one's self-perfection for the 
fulfillment of epistemic virtue and knowledge. Therefore, moral virtues 
cultivate and purify the soul, and, in the final stage, help the agent to 
obtain true knowledge. Thus, virtue, with its moral and epistemic types, 
right actions, motives, and knowledge are considered the constructive 
elements of personal identity. In other words, all of the moral and 
intellectual factors contribute to forming personal identity. As a result, 
the stronger these factors are, the more pious the agent will be. In this 
regard, belief in God is very important. It not only purifies the heart but 
also motivates the agent to do the right action easily. 
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